If the same objects could not be thought as things in themselves, there would be appearance without anything that appears
If we could not think the same objects that are given to us as appearances also as things in themselves, it would follow that there is appearance without anything that appears.
Denn sonst würde der ungereimte Satz daraus folgen, daß Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da erscheint.
For otherwise the absurd proposition would follow that there is appearance without anything that appears.
The "Denn sonst" sentence of B xxvii: "For otherwise the absurd proposition would follow that there is appearance without anything that appears" (AA 3:17.05–07), where "otherwise" refers back to the reservation that we must be able to think the same objects as things in themselves (AA 3:17.02–05). Kant gives no further ground for the conditional in this place.
Supports
- a-kant-appearance-requires-thing-in-itselfWe must be able to think the same objects as things in themselves, or there would be appearance without anything that appears