The Kantian distinction makes Locke's primary qualities too belong only to the appearance, because its conditions, space, time and causality, are cognized by us a priori

The passage

The Kantian distinction, setting out from an incomparably higher standpoint than Locke's, declares all that Locke had let pass as primary qualities, that is, properties of the thing in itself, to belong likewise only to its appearance in our faculty of apprehension, and this precisely because its conditions, space, time and causality, are cognized by us a priori.

The sixth sentence of the appendix's opening paragraph, which closes the comparison with Locke: Locke had taken sound, colour, hardness and the like from the thing in itself and left it extension, shape, solidity, number and mobility; the Kantian distinction, »Diese« in the sentence, takes those too, »und zwar gerade deshalb, weil Bedingungen desselben, Raum, Zeit und Kausalität, von uns a priori erkannt werden«. The subject of the sentence is the Kantian distinction, so what it declares is Kant's doctrine as Schopenhauer states it; the »weil« clause, in the indicative and outside the report, is Schopenhauer's own ground, so both statements assert that space is cognized a priori, the convention's first branch for a shared premise. The second »desselben«, in »Bedingungen desselben«, is not »der Erscheinung«, which is feminine, but either »des Dinges an sich« or »unserm Auffassungsvermögen«; the sense is the conditions of the appearance in the faculty, and the statement's »its« is to be read so, not as conditions of the thing in itself, of which nothing is cognized a priori. Grisebach's text reads »die Bedingungen desselben«, said on the passage. The link shares_premise_with is set to c-kant-space-a-priori, Kant's A 24 / B 38, space »eine nothwendige Vorstellung a priori«, and the comparison x-thing-in-itself names the pair in a second entry under the premise that space is given a priori, the first being this appendix's own sentence »der Raum ... ist eine a priori gegebene, folglich subjektive Form unsers Intellekts« (c-schopenhauer-causality-sensation-and-space-are-subjective). The statement asserts more than the premise: that the ground covers time and causality too, and that Locke's primary qualities belong to the appearance; Kant's statement says nothing of Locke. »Auffassungsvermögen« is rendered »faculty of apprehension«.