Because space is intuited a priori, and no determination of things, absolute or relative, can be intuited before the existence of the things to which it belongs, space is not a determination of things in themselves.
s space is a determination of things in themselves, absolute or relative, and so could be intuited only after the existence of the things to which it belongs, hence not a priori
P1a
P2(s → ¬a)
C¬s
Machine check, truth table: valid: the conclusion holds in all 1 assignments of a, s that satisfy the premises. The check says nothing about whether the premises are true or faithful to the passage; only a named human can (DISPUTES.md).
The argument is the one sentence of reason given for conclusion (a) at A 26 / B 42: space is no determination of things in themselves, "for neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, hence not a priori" (AA 3:55.06–08). The first premise, that an a priori intuition of space underlies all concepts of it, is the conclusion of the third point of the metaphysical exposition (A 25 / B 39–40, AA 3:53.14–16).
What the form captures and what it leaves out: premise 2 is rendered as "if space were a determination of things in themselves, it would not be intuited a priori", which is the contrapositive use Kant makes of the general sentence at AA 3:55.06–08; the equation of "before the existence of the things" with "a priori" is Kant's "mithin" in that sentence and belongs to premise 2, not to premise 1. The form does not represent the generality of that sentence (every determination of things), only its application to space.