Freedom can be thought without contradiction, if the critical distinction of the two kinds of representation holds

The passage

I can nevertheless think freedom, that is, the representation of it at least contains no contradiction in itself, if our critical distinction of the two kinds of representation, the sensible and the intellectual, and the restriction of the pure concepts of the understanding arising from it, and hence of the principles flowing from them, holds.

The main clause of the sentence at B xxviii (AA 3:18.06–11). What »denken« comes to is said in the text itself, »d. i. die Vorstellung davon enthält wenigstens keinen Widerspruch in sich«, and the statement keeps the »wenigstens«. The claim is conditional on the critical distinction and the restriction that follows from it, and the statement keeps the »wenn«; The condition names the distinction of »Vorstellungsarten«, kinds of representation, where the sentence before named two meanings of the object; the argument that reaches this claim takes the two as one condition, says that the identification is the map's, and names the restriction as the second part of the antecedent, a-kant-freedom-thinkable-under-the-critical-distinction. B xxviii–xxix then draws the consequence for morality (c-kant-same-action-in-another-relation), after the supposition of the contrary (c-kant-if-freedom-unthinkable-morality-yields-to-mechanism).