Kant showed the laws of experience, and with them the world itself, to be conditioned by the subject's mode of cognition, so that along their guiding thread one comes no step toward the essence of the world in itself
Kant showed those laws, the laws that rule in experience, and consequently the world itself, to be conditioned by the subject's mode of cognition, from which it followed that, however far one might go on inquiring and inferring along their guiding thread, in the cognition of the essence of the world in itself and outside representation one would come not one step forward.
Kam zeigte jene Gesetze, und folglich die Welt selbst, als durch die Erkenntnißweise des Subjekts bedingt; woraus folgte, daß, soweit man auch am Leitfaden jener weiter forschte und weiter schlösse, man in der Hauptsache, d.h. in der Erkenntniß des Wesens der Welt an sich und außer der Vorstellung, keinen Schritt vorwärts käme, sondern nur sich so bewegte, wie das Eichhörnchen im Rade.
Kant showed those laws, and consequently the world itself, to be conditioned by the subject's mode of cognition; from which it followed that, however far one might go on inquiring and inferring along the guiding thread of those laws, in the main matter, that is, in the cognition of the essence of the world in itself and outside representation, one would come not one step forward, but would only move as the squirrel does in its wheel.
The last of the four stored sentences at ZA II 516; the transcription's »Kam« is a slip for »Kant«, said on the passage. »Jene Gesetze« are the laws of the first sentence (c-schopenhauer-kant-showed-laws-of-experience-not-applicable-to-derive-existence), the principle of sufficient reason in its shapes. The sentence has two parts, which the statement keeps in their order: what Kant showed, that the laws »und folglich die Welt selbst« are conditioned by the subject's mode of cognition; and what followed from it, »woraus folgte«, that along their guiding thread one comes no step forward in the cognition of the essence of the world in itself and outside representation. The second part is drawn by the text from the first inside one sentence, and the map keeps it inside one claim rather than formalizing the step; a reader may ask for it as an argument. No link shares_premise_with is set: the Kant statements in the map make space the subjective condition of sensibility (c-kant-space-subjective-condition-of-sensibility) and restrict cognition to objects of experience (c-kant-knowledge-limited-to-experience), and no Kant statement in the map says that the world itself is conditioned by the subject's mode of cognition, which is Schopenhauer's »folglich«, nor words the sentence's second part. In the comparison x-thing-in-itself the sentence stands in the row on reaching the thing in itself by inference and in the row on what in appearance is the subject's own, in both as Schopenhauer's statement of what Kant showed. »Erkenntnißweise« is rendered »mode of cognition«, »Wesen« »essence«.