Without the distinction of things as objects of experience from the same things as things in themselves, causality would hold of all things in general
Had the distinction, made necessary by the critique, of things as objects of experience from the very same things as things in themselves not been made, the principle of causality, and with it the mechanism of nature in determining them, would have to hold without exception of all things in general as efficient causes.
Nun wollen wir annehmen, die durch unsere Kritik nothwendiggemachte Unterscheidung der Dinge als Gegenstände der Erfahrung von eben denselben als Dingen an sich selbst wäre gar nicht gemacht, so müßte der Grundsatz der Causalität und mithin der Naturmechanism in Bestimmung derselben durchaus von allen Dingen überhaupt als wirkenden Ursachen gelten.
Now let us assume that the distinction, made necessary by our critique, of things as objects of experience from the very same things as things in themselves had not been made at all; then the principle of causality, and with it the mechanism of nature in the determination of them, would have to hold without exception of all things in general as efficient causes.
The first sentence of the case of the will at B xxvii (AA 3:17.07–12). It is a counterfactual, »wollen wir annehmen ... wäre gar nicht gemacht, so müßte ... gelten«, and the statement keeps it as one: Kant does not say that causality holds of all things, but what would follow were the distinction not made. The distinction is the one B xxvi calls proved in the analytical part, that we cognize objects only as appearances (c-kant-objects-known-only-as-appearances, 3:16.34–37), here named »durch unsere Kritik nothwendig gemachte«. What follows from the counterfactual in the next sentence is drawn by »also« (c-kant-without-distinction-free-will-is-a-contradiction).
Supports
- c-kant-without-distinction-free-will-is-a-contradictionWithout the distinction, a free will subject to natural necessity would be an obvious contradiction