Without the distinction, a free will subject to natural necessity would be an obvious contradiction
Had the distinction of things as objects of experience from the very same things as things in themselves not been made, I could not say of the very same being, for instance the human soul, that its will is free and yet at the same time subject to natural necessity, that is, not free, without falling into an obvious contradiction, because I have taken the soul in both propositions in the very same meaning, as a thing in general (as a thing in itself), and without a preceding critique could not take it otherwise.
Von eben demselben Wesen also, z. B. der menschlichen Seele, würde ich nicht sagen können, ihr Wille sei frei, und er sei doch zugleich der Naturnothwendigkeit unterworfen, d. i. nicht frei, ohne in einen offenbaren Widerspruch zu gerathen, weil ich die Seele in beiden Sätzen in eben derselben Bedeutung, nämlich als Ding überhaupt (als Sache an sich selbst), genommen habe und ohne vorhergehende Kritik auch nicht anders nehmen konnte.
Of the very same being, then, for instance the human soul, I could not say that its will is free and that it is nevertheless at the same time subject to natural necessity, that is, not free, without falling into an obvious contradiction, because I have taken the soul in both propositions in the very same meaning, namely as a thing in general (as a thing in itself), and without a preceding critique could not take it otherwise.
The second sentence of the case at B xxvii (AA 3:17.12–18), still under the supposition of the first, which the statement restates in its opening clause so that the sentence can be read alone; the taking of the soul in one meaning is in the indicative, »genommen habe«, and only the saying is counterfactual, which the translation keeps. The text draws it from the first by »also« (3:17.12): »Von eben demselben Wesen also ... würde ich nicht sagen können«, so depends_on names the first sentence's claim (c-kant-without-distinction-causality-holds-of-all-things) and the step is not formalized as an argument; a reader who wants it checked may ask for it. The reason the sentence gives for the contradiction is the middle term of the whole case: the soul taken »in beiden Sätzen in eben derselben Bedeutung« (3:17.15–16). Kant writes »Ding überhaupt (als Sache an sich selbst)« (3:17.16–17), the parenthesis glossing the noun, and the statement renders both nouns »thing«. The contradiction is of saying free and not free of one thing in one meaning; the next sentence (c-kant-same-will-not-free-as-appearance-free-as-thing-in-itself) removes it by the two meanings.
Depends on
- c-kant-without-distinction-causality-holds-of-all-thingsWithout the distinction of things as objects of experience from the same things as things in themselves, causality would hold of all things in general