The belief in immediate certainties is a moral naïveté and, morality aside, a stupidity
The belief in "immediate certainties" is a moral naïveté which does us philosophers honour; morality aside, that belief is a stupidity which does us little honour.
Der Glaube an "unmittelbare Gewissheiten" ist eine moralische Naivetät, welche uns Philosophen Ehre macht
The belief in "immediate certainties" is a moral naïveté which does us philosophers honour
Von der Moral abgesehn, ist jener Glaube eine Dummheit, die uns wenig Ehre macht!
Morality aside, that belief is a stupidity which does us little honour!
The first and third sentences of the passage; the second, »wir sollen nun einmal nicht "nur moralische" Menschen sein«, is the turn between them and is in the passage. The statement evaluates the belief, as a naïveté and a stupidity, and does not say that there are no immediate certainties; JGB 16 says that »unmittelbare Gewissheit« includes a contradictio in adjecto (c-nietzsche-immediate-certainty-contradictio-in-adjecto) and names Schopenhauer's »ich will« (c-nietzsche-schopenhauer-ich-will-a-superstition), and the attack links on Schopenhauer's c-schopenhauer-will-not-inferred-but-immediately-known rest on those sentences. This passage names no one, and its words judge the belief rather than deny what the Schopenhauer statement states, so no attack link is set from it; the comparison x-thing-in-itself lists it in the row on immediacy.