In the »An-sich« there is nothing of causal connections, necessity or law
In the "in-itself" there is nothing of "causal connections", of "necessity", of "psychological unfreedom"; there "the effect" does not follow "upon the cause", no "law" governs that.
Im "An-sich" giebt es nichts von "Causal-Verbänden", von "Nothwendigkeit", von "psychologischer Unfreiheit", da folgt nicht "die Wirkung auf die Ursache", das regiert kein "Gesetz".
In the "in-itself" there is nothing of "causal connections", of "necessity", of "psychological unfreedom"; there "the effect" does not follow "upon the cause", no "law" governs that.
The second sentence of the passage. Every quotation mark is Nietzsche's, »"An-sich"« among them: the sentence speaks of the in-itself as a term set off, and the statement keeps the marks so that a reader does not take him to assert an in-itself; JGB 16 calls »Ding an sich« a contradictio in adjecto (c-nietzsche-immediate-certainty-contradictio-in-adjecto). Kant at B xxvii has things in the second meaning, as things in themselves, not subject to the principle of causality, if the deduction is right (c-kant-causality-applies-only-to-things-as-objects-of-experience), and Schopenhauer's will as thing in itself is free of the forms whose common expression is the principle of sufficient reason (c-schopenhauer-will-free-of-forms-of-appearance, § 23). The three sentences come close, and the map sets no shares_premise_with link: Kant's clause stands under »wenn die Deduction ... richtig ist«, and Nietzsche's »An-sich« is a term in his own quotation marks of which the next sentence says that we invent what we then read into things (c-nietzsche-projecting-sign-world-as-in-itself-is-mythology); whether the three assert one proposition is said and left open on x-thing-in-itself, where a reader may dispute the absence of the link.