A reality that is neither representation nor will, an object in itself, is a dreamt-up absurdity

The passage

A reality that would be neither representation nor will, but an object in itself, is a dreamt-up absurdity, and the assumption of it a will-o'-the-wisp in philosophy.

§ 1, ZA I 30: »Eine Realität aber, die keines von diesen Beiden wäre, sondern ein Objekt an sich ..., ist ein erträumtes Unding und dessen Annahme ein Irrlicht in der Philosophie.« The parenthesis in the same sentence says that Kant's thing in itself »leider unter den Händen« degenerated into such an object in itself. That is said of Kant without a passage of Kant, and of a degeneration »unter den Händen«, not of the doctrine itself. An object in itself, a reality that is an object apart from any subject, is what the two-object reading of Kant takes the thing in itself to be (r-kant-two-object); the map notes the kinship without claiming that Schopenhauer offers that reading. What Schopenhauer keeps of Kant's thing in itself is stated at c-schopenhauer-only-the-derivation-is-faulty.