The two-object reading of "eben dieselben Gegenstände"

The passage

Things in themselves are entities distinct from appearances: non-spatiotemporal things that exist independently of our representations and ground the appearances, which are representations in us.

A reading of

The same objects must be thinkable, though not knowable, as things in themselves

Literature

P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966), Part Four, 'The Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism'

Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Part V, 'Transcendental idealism', which holds that for Kant there are things in themselves independent of our representations and that they are not spatiotemporal

James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 10, 'Noumena and Things in Themselves', which argues against the one-world or double-aspect view and holds that appearances are intentional objects, constructions out of the states of perceivers, distinct from things in themselves

The texts it rests on. B xxvi–xxvii: without things in themselves there would be "Erscheinung ohne etwas ..., was da erscheint" (AA 3:17.06–07): an appearance and a something that appears. Prolegomena §32: to regard the objects of the senses as mere appearances is to grant "daß ihnen ein Ding an sich selbst zum Grunde liege"; the understanding "gesteht auch das Dasein von Dingen an sich selbst zu"; they are "Wesen, die den Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegen", "bloßer Verstandeswesen" (4:314.33–315.06): existence, grounding, beings of the understanding. A 42 / B 59: how it stands with "den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Receptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit" remains unknown; "wir kennen nichts als unsere Art, sie wahrzunehmen" (3:65.17–20). Prolegomena §57: it is absurd "gar keine Dinge an sich selbst einräumen" (4:350.35): things in themselves are something one admits or denies. B xxvii–xxviii has the will thought "als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig" (3:17.26–27), as belonging to a thing in itself whose visible actions are its appearance, a phrase this reading can claim and the two-aspect reading can also claim (c-kant-same-will-not-free-as-appearance-free-as-thing-in-itself).

What it holds. On this reading the thing in itself is a distinct entity, the ground of the appearance (Strawson 1966, Part Four; Guyer 1987, Part V; Van Cleve 1999, ch. 10). The argument at B xxvi (a-kant-appearance-requires-thing-in-itself) is then an inference to the existence of such a ground, and the Prolegomena §57 argument (a-kant-denying-things-in-themselves-absurd) a second one; the unknowability claim (c-kant-things-in-themselves-unknown) is a claim about those entities.

What depends on it. Read this way, the Prolegomena §57 argument is an existence proof, and the restriction of the categories to objects of experience (B 308–309, 3:210.24–34) becomes a problem for it, since "ground" is a category; the unknowability claim then says of distinct things that nothing of them is known. Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's criticisms, when the map reaches them, will be recorded against this reading where their texts name it.

What tells against it. B xxvi's "eben dieselben Gegenstände" (3:17.03–04) and B xxviii–xxix's "eben derselben Handlung (in anderer Beziehung genommen)" (3:18.24–25) speak of one object or action under two descriptions, as does B xxvii's "das Object in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen" (3:17.19): the texts the two-aspect reading rests on. And the inference to a distinct ground sits uneasily with the restriction of the categories, cause among them, to objects of possible experience (B 308–309, 3:210.24–34).

The map does not pick a reading (CHARTER.md P9). Its Kant nodes are stated in Kant's own phrases, so that each reading can be checked against them; where a node's wording leans one way, the body says so.