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Should the objects appearing in the forms not be empty phantoms but have a meaning, they must point to something that is no representation but a thing in itself

Should the objects appearing in the forms of time, space and causality not be empty phantoms but have a meaning, then they would have to point to something, be the expression of something, that is not again, as they are, object, representation, present only relatively, for a subject, but exists without such dependence on something standing over against it as its essential condition and on its forms, that is, is no representation but a thing in itself; accordingly it could at least be asked whether those representations are something besides and apart from their being representations, objects of the subject.

Sollten nun aber die in diesen Formen erscheinenden Objekte nicht leere Phantome seyn; sondern eine Bedeutung haben: so müßten sie auf etwas deuten, der Ausdruck von etwas seyn, das nicht wieder wie sie selbst Objekt, Vorstellung, ein nur relativ, nämlich für ein Subjekt, Vorhandenes wäre; sondern welches ohne solche Abhängigkeit von einem ihm als wesentliche Bedingung Gegenüberstehenden und dessen Formen existirte, d. h. eben keine Vorstellung, sondern ein Ding an sich wäre.

But should the objects appearing in these forms not be empty phantoms, but have a meaning, then they would have to point to something, be the expression of something, that was not again, as they themselves are, object, representation, something present only relatively, namely for a subject; but which existed without such dependence on something standing over against it as its essential condition and on that thing's forms, that is, was no representation but a thing in itself.

Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Erster Band Zweites Buch, § 24, first paragraph (ZA page not given; Grisebach's pagination, which the source marks, pp. 174–175)

§ 24, first paragraph. The sentence is a conditional, »Sollten nun aber ... so müßten sie«, and what follows it is a question, »Demnach ließe sich wenigstens fragen«; the statement keeps the conditional and the »wenigstens«, and asserts neither that the objects have a meaning nor that there is a thing in itself. The paragraph's last sentence answers the question with the will, »unsere Antwort«, which § 21 states (c-schopenhauer-will-alone-is-thing-in-itself) and which the sentence here sets aside »für jetzt«. Set beside Kant's B xxvi (c-kant-without-things-in-themselves-appearance-without-appearing), the two conditionals differ: Kant's antecedent is our being unable to think the objects also as things in themselves, its consequent an absurdity, appearance without anything that appears, in the consequent; Schopenhauer's has a meaning in the antecedent and a thing in itself in the consequent, and the Anhang's charge against Kant's derivation (c-schopenhauer-kant-grounds-thing-in-itself-on-causal-inference) is not raised against this sentence of his own, which names no inference. No link is set between the two claims, since neither states the other's conditional; the comparison x-thing-in-itself sets them side by side.

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Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Erster Band Zweites Buch, § 24, first paragraph (ZA page not given; Grisebach's pagination, which the source marks, pp. 174–175)Projekt Gutenberg-DE, Band I, chapter 26 (§ 24), the text of Grisebach's edition (Reclam, Leipzig 1892, second, repeatedly corrected printing); zeno.org unreachable

Wir haben von dem großen Kant gelernt, daß Zeit, Raum und Kausalität, ihrer ganzen Gesetzmäßigkeit und der Möglichkeit aller ihrer Formen nach, in unserm Bewußtseyn vorhanden sind, ganz unabhängig von den Objekten, die in ihnen erscheinen, die ihren Inhalt ausmachen, oder mit anderen Worten: daß sie eben sowohl, wenn man vom Subjekt, als wenn man vom Objekt ausgeht, gefunden werden können; daher man sie mit gleichem Recht Anschauungsweisen des Subjekts, oder auch Beschaffenheiten des Objekts, sofern es Objekt (bei Kant: Erscheinung) d. h. Vorstellung ist, nennen kann. Auch kann man jene Formen ansehen als die untheilbare Gränze zwischen Objekt und Subjekt: daher zwar alles Objekt in ihnen erscheinen muß, aber auch das Subjekt, unabhängig vom erscheinenden Objekt, sie vollständig besitzt und übersieht. – Sollten nun aber die in diesen Formen erscheinenden Objekte nicht leere Phantome seyn; sondern eine Bedeutung haben: so müßten sie auf etwas deuten, der Ausdruck von etwas seyn, das nicht wieder wie sie selbst Objekt, Vorstellung, ein nur relativ, nämlich für ein Subjekt, Vorhandenes wäre; sondern welches ohne solche Abhängigkeit von einem ihm als wesentliche Bedingung Gegenüberstehenden und dessen Formen existirte, d. h. eben keine Vorstellung, sondern ein Ding an sich wäre. Demnach ließe sich wenigstens fragen: sind jene Vorstellungen, jene Objekte, noch etwas außerdem und abgesehen davon, daß sie Vorstellungen, Objekte des Subjekts sind? Und was alsdann wären sie in diesem Sinn? Was ist jene ihre andere von der Vorstellung toto genere verschiedene Seite? Was ist das Ding an sich? – Der Wille: ist unsere Antwort gewesen, die ich jedoch für jetzt bei Seite setze.

We have learned from the great Kant that time, space and causality, in their whole lawfulness and in the possibility of all their forms, are present in our consciousness wholly independently of the objects that appear in them and make up their content; or in other words: that they can be found just as well when one starts from the subject as when one starts from the object; and so one can with equal right call them ways of intuiting of the subject, or also qualities of the object in so far as it is object (in Kant: appearance), that is, representation. One can also regard those forms as the indivisible boundary between object and subject: so that every object must indeed appear in them, but the subject too, independently of the appearing object, possesses and surveys them completely. – But should the objects appearing in these forms not be empty phantoms, but have a meaning, then they would have to point to something, be the expression of something, that was not again, as they themselves are, object, representation, something present only relatively, namely for a subject; but which existed without such dependence on something standing over against it as its essential condition and on that thing's forms, that is, was no representation but a thing in itself. Accordingly it could at least be asked: are those representations, those objects, something besides and apart from their being representations, objects of the subject? And what would they then be in this sense? What is that other side of them, toto genere different from the representation? What is the thing in itself? – The will: has been our answer, which however I set aside for now. — the project

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