The state expressed in "I think" has no immediate certainty, because settling what it is presupposes a comparison with other states I know in myself

The passage

Because "I think" presupposes that I compare my momentary state with other states I know in myself in order to settle what it is, that state refers back to other knowledge, and so has for me at any rate no immediate certainty.

The argument

1. P1"I think" presupposes that I compare my momentary state with other states I know in myself
2. P2Assumption. If "I think" presupposes that I compare my momentary state with other states I know in myself, then my momentary state refers back to other knowledge (the map's identification of the comparison with the sentence's »dieser Rückbeziehung auf anderweitiges Wissen«, which the demonstrative warrants)
3. P3Assumption. If my momentary state refers back to other knowledge, it has for me no immediate certainty (the sentence's »wegen«, which gives the back-reference as the reason; the general principle is instanced here, not stated)
4. Infer.modus ponens, twice
5. CThe state expressed in "I think" has for me at any rate no immediate certainty

The argument is one sentence of JGB 16, in the philosopher's mouth: »Genug, jenes ich denke setzt voraus, dass ich meinen augenblicklichen Zustand mit anderen Zuständen, die ich an mir kenne, vergleiche, um so festzusetzen, was er ist: wegen dieser Rückbeziehung auf anderweitiges Wissen hat er für mich jedenfalls keine unmittelbare Gewissheit.«

What the form captures and what it leaves out. Premise 1 is the first half of the sentence. Premise 2 is the map's identification: the sentence's »dieser Rückbeziehung auf anderweitiges Wissen« names, by its demonstrative, the comparison just described, and the map reads the comparison as a back-reference to other knowledge. Premise 3 is the »wegen«: the back-reference is given as the reason for the lack of immediate certainty, and the map reads that reason as a conditional holding in this instance; the sentence does not state the general principle that whatever refers back to other knowledge lacks immediate certainty, and the map does not attribute it. Both assumptions are the map's and a reader may dispute either. The grammatical subject of »hat er ... keine unmittelbare Gewissheit« is »meinen augenblicklichen Zustand« (»was er ist«), not »jenes ich denke«, which is neuter; the atoms and the conclusion claim speak of the state accordingly, and JGB 17 says the same of the »Ich« (c-nietzsche-es-denkt-already-an-interpretation). The form does not cover the ground of premise 1, the sentence before (»wonach sollte ich abmessen, dass, was eben geschieht, nicht vielleicht Wollen oder Fühlen sei?«), nor the »Reihe von verwegenen Behauptungen« the aphorism lists before that. The aphorism opens with Schopenhauer's »ich will« as a second alleged immediate certainty (c-nietzsche-schopenhauer-ich-will-a-superstition) and does not run this analysis for it; the conclusion here is about »ich denke« alone.