Freedom, as a property of a being that has effects in the world of sense, cannot be cognized by speculative reason
I cannot cognize my soul, considered from the side of the thing in itself, by any speculative reason, still less by empirical observation, and hence cannot cognize freedom either as a property of a being to which I ascribe effects in the world of sense, because I would have to cognize such a being as determined in its existence and yet not in time, which is impossible since I can lay no intuition under my concept.
Ob ich nun gleich meine Seele, von der letzteren Seite betrachtet, durch keine speculative Vernunft, (noch weniger durch empirische Beobachtung) mithin auch nicht die Freiheit als Eigenschaft eines Wesens, dem ich Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt zuschreibe, erkennen kann, darum weil ich ein solches seiner Existenz nach und doch nicht in der Zeit bestimmt erkennen müßte (welches, weil ich meinem Begriffe keine Anschauung unterlegen kann, unmöglich ist)
Now although I cannot cognize my soul, considered from the latter side, by any speculative reason (still less by empirical observation), and hence cannot cognize freedom either as a property of a being to which I ascribe effects in the world of sense, because I would have to cognize such a being as determined in its existence and yet not in time (which is impossible, because I can lay no intuition under my concept)
The concessive clause of the sentence at B xxviii (AA 3:17.28–18.06), »Ob ich nun gleich ...«, before the »so kann ich mir doch« that is c-kant-freedom-thinkable-if-critical-distinction-holds. »Von der letzteren Seite betrachtet« refers to the sentence before, where the will was taken »als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig« (3:17.26–27), and the statement spells the side out as that of the thing in itself; the text says »the latter side«. Three steps are in the sentence and kept: the soul so considered cannot be cognized by speculative reason; »mithin« neither can freedom as a property of a being with effects in the world of sense; and the reason, »darum weil«, that cognizing it would require cognizing a being as determined in its existence and yet not in time, impossible for want of an intuition. The negative claim is about cognizing (»erkennen«), not thinking; the same distinction as at B xxvi (c-kant-things-in-themselves-thinkable-not-knowable), here applied to freedom.