Without the apparent world there would be no life, and nothing of those philosophers' »Wahrheit« would remain either
There would be no life at all were it not on the ground of perspectival estimations and apparentnesses; and if one wanted, with the enthusiasm of some philosophers, to do away with the "apparent world" altogether, supposing they could, nothing of their "truth" would remain either.
es bestünde gar kein Leben, wenn nicht auf dem Grunde perspektivischer Schätzungen und Scheinbarkeiten; und wollte man, mit der tugendhaften Begeisterung und Tölpelei mancher Philosophen, die "scheinbare Welt" ganz abschlaffen, nun, gesetzt, ihr könntet das, - so bliebe mindestens dabei auch von eurer "Wahrheit" nichts mehr übrig!
there would be no life at all were it not on the ground of perspectival estimations and apparentnesses; and if one wanted, with the virtuous enthusiasm and doltishness of some philosophers, to do away with the "apparent world" altogether, well, supposing you could do that, - then at least nothing of your "truth" would remain either!
The second sentence of the passage, after »Man gestehe sich doch so viel ein«. The statement keeps »wollte man« as "wanted", the supposition »gesetzt, ihr könntet das« as "supposing they could", and the »ihr« and »eurer« as "they" and "their", the addressees being the »manche Philosophen« of »tugendhafter Begeisterung und Tölpelei«, who are not named; »mindestens« and »Tölpelei« are dropped from the statement and kept in the quotation, and the quotation marks on »"Wahrheit"« are Nietzsche's. The sentence is the nearest the map holds to a converse of stage 6 of the Fabel, where abolishing the true world abolishes the apparent one (c-nietzsche-abolishing-true-world-abolishes-apparent, read on that node as Nietzsche's own voice): here doing away with the apparent world leaves nothing of those philosophers' »"Wahrheit"«. That the »"Wahrheit"« of this sentence is the »wahre Welt« of the Fabel is the map's identification, not the texts'; the two sentences are in two works, no connective joins them, the map sets no link and formalizes no argument, and the comparison x-thing-in-itself sets them beside Kant's B xxvi, where without things in themselves there would be appearance without anything that appears (c-kant-without-things-in-themselves-appearance-without-appearing). Kant's sentence concerns appearance and the thing in itself, this one the apparent world and »Wahrheit«, so no link is set between them either.