The belief that will and action are somehow one is among the erroneous inferences attached to willing, arising from the expectation of the effect of the command
Among the chain of erroneous inferences attached to willing: because in the very great majority of cases there has been willing only where the effect of the command, that is obedience, that is the action, could also be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the feeling as if there were a necessity of effect there; enough, the one who wills believes, with a fair degree of assurance, that will and action are somehow one.
Weil in den allermeisten Fällen nur gewollt worden ist, wo auch die Wirkung des Befehls, also der Gehorsam, also die Aktion erwartet werden durfte, so hat sich der Anschein in das Gefühl übersetzt, als ob es da eine Nothwendigkeit von Wirkung gäbe; genug, der Wollende glaubt, mit einem ziemlichen Grad von Sicherheit, dass Wille und Aktion irgendwie Eins seien
Because in the very great majority of cases there has been willing only where the effect of the command, that is obedience, that is the action, could also be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the feeling, as if there were a necessity of effect there; enough, the one who wills believes, with a fair degree of assurance, that will and action are somehow one
JGB 19: »hat sich an das Wollen noch eine ganze Kette von irrthümlichen Schlüssen und folglich von falschen Werthschätzungen des Willens selbst angehängt, - dergestalt, dass der Wollende mit gutem Glauben glaubt, Wollen genüge zur Aktion. Weil in den allermeisten Fällen nur gewollt worden ist, wo auch die Wirkung des Befehls, also der Gehorsam, also die Aktion erwartet werden durfte, so hat sich der Anschein in das Gefühl übersetzt, als ob es da eine Nothwendigkeit von Wirkung gäbe; genug, der Wollende glaubt, mit einem ziemlichen Grad von Sicherheit, dass Wille und Aktion irgendwie Eins seien«. The »Weil ... so« is inside one sentence and the map keeps the whole as one claim; the opening "among the chain of erroneous inferences" is the sentence before, which the statement needs in order to say what the sentence denies. The map sets this claim as an attack on Schopenhauer's c-schopenhauer-act-of-will-and-action-of-body-identical, which states that act of will and action of the body »sind Eines und das Selbe« and do not stand »im Verhältniß der Ursache und Wirkung« (WWV I § 18, ZA I 142): this sentence makes the belief that they are one an erroneous inference, and the product of an expected »Wirkung des Befehls«, that is of a relation of effect, which is the relation Schopenhauer denies; the attack is on both halves of what the target states. Schopenhauer is not named in these sentences; he is named at the opening of the aphorism (c-nietzsche-schopenhauer-took-over-popular-prejudice), and the map records that the attack rests on the aphorism's unity, not on a sentence that names him.
Replies to
- c-schopenhauer-act-of-will-and-action-of-body-identicalThe act of will and the action of the body are one and the same, given in two ways