To do physiology one must insist that the sense organs are not appearances in the sense of idealist philosophy, since as such they could be no causes
To do physiology with a good conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not appearances in the sense of idealist philosophy: as such they could be no causes.
Um Physiologie mit gutem Gewissen zu treiben, muss man darauf halten, dass die Sinnesorgane nicht Erscheinungen sind im Sinne der idealistischen Philosophie: als solche könnten sie ja keine Ursachen sein!
To do physiology with a good conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not appearances in the sense of idealist philosophy: as such they could be no causes!
The first sentence of JGB 15. The statement keeps the sentence's frame, »um Physiologie mit gutem Gewissen zu treiben«: what is asserted is a condition of doing physiology, and the ground given is that appearances »als solche« could be no causes. The sentence names no philosopher and no passage; »im Sinne der idealistischen Philosophie« is left as it stands, and the map does not say whose idealism is meant. Schopenhauer's statement that appearance means representation and every object is appearance (c-schopenhauer-appearance-is-representation, § 21) and that the body is given as representation among objects (c-schopenhauer-body-given-in-two-ways, § 18) are the nearest in the map; the map sets no attack link, since the attacker's statement would have to deny what the target states and this one denies that the sense organs are appearances in a sense it does not identify as Schopenhauer's, and the organs are not named in Schopenhauer's statements. A reader who holds that the sense is his may dispute the absence of the link. The comparison x-thing-in-itself sets the three texts side by side in its row on whether the world of appearance is the subject's own work.