The two-aspect reading of "eben dieselben Gegenstände"

The passage

Appearances and things in themselves are not two kinds of object but the same objects considered in two ways: as they appear under the subjective conditions of our sensibility, and as they are in themselves, apart from those conditions.

A reading of

The same objects must be thinkable, though not knowable, as things in themselves

Literature

Gerold Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), which reads Kant's 'Ding an sich' as the elliptical 'Ding, an sich selbst betrachtet'

Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, revised edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), ch. 2, 'Transcendental Realism and Transcendental Idealism'

The texts it rests on. B xxvi: it is reserved "daß wir eben dieselben Gegenstände auch als Dinge an sich selbst, wenn gleich nicht erkennen, doch wenigstens müssen denken können" (AA 3:17.03–05): the same objects, thought also as things in themselves. B xxvii– xxviii: the critique "das Object in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen lehrt, nämlich als Erscheinung oder als Ding an sich selbst" (3:17.19–20), and "eben derselbe Wille" is thought as not free in the appearance and as free "als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig" (3:17.24–27): one object in two meanings, one will under both, though »als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig« is a phrase the two-object reading can also claim (c-kant-same-will-not-free-as-appearance-free-as-thing-in-itself). B xxviii– xxix: freedom puts no obstacle in the way of "dem Naturmechanism eben derselben Handlung (in anderer Beziehung genommen)" (3:18.24–25): one action, two relations. A 26 / B 42: space is no determination of things "die an Gegenständen selbst haftete, und welche bliebe, wenn man auch von allen subjectiven Bedingungen der Anschauung abstrahirte" (3:55.04–05): the thing in itself is what is left when one abstracts from the subjective conditions.

What it holds. On this reading the thing in itself is the object considered apart from the conditions under which it appears (Prauss 1974; Allison 2004, ch. 2). The claim that things in themselves are unknown (c-kant-things-in-themselves-unknown) is then a claim about what can be known of objects so considered, not about a second set of entities, and the argument at B xxvi that appearance presupposes something that appears (a-kant-appearance-requires-thing-in-itself) is read as a claim about the concept of appearance, not an inference to the existence of a further thing.

What depends on it. Read this way, the claim that the same action may be taken in another relation (c-kant-same-action-in-another-relation, B xxviii–xxix, 3:18.24–25) is the doctrine applied: one action, free in one relation and mechanically determined in the other, with no second entity. The Prolegomena §57 argument (a-kant-denying-things-in-themselves-absurd) is read as defending a way of considering objects, not the existence of further ones.

What tells against it. B xxvi continues "daß Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da erscheint" (3:17.06–07), and Prolegomena §32 says the understanding "gesteht auch das Dasein von Dingen an sich selbst zu" and speaks of "Wesen, die den Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegen" (4:315.02–05), and in the same passage of "die Art, wie unsre Sinnen von diesem unbekannten Etwas afficirt werden" (4:314.36–315.01): a grounding and an affecting relation between distinct relata, the text the two-object reading rests on. A 42 / B 59 asks how it stands with "den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Receptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit" (3:65.17–18), which both readings can claim.

The map does not pick a reading (CHARTER.md P9). Its Kant nodes are stated in Kant's own phrases, so that each reading can be checked against them; where a node's wording leans one way, the body says so.