The will: Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche

The passages

What the three say, in their own words

Kant, B xxvii–xxviii: if the critique has not erred, »da sie das Object in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen lehrt, nämlich als Erscheinung oder als Ding an sich selbst«, and if the deduction of its concepts of the understanding is right, »so wird eben derselbe Wille in der Erscheinung (den sichtbaren Handlungen) als dem Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäß und so fern nicht frei und doch andererseits als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig jenem nicht unterworfen, mithin als frei gedacht, ohne daß hiebei ein Widerspruch vorgeht« (AA 3:17.18–28, c-kant-same-will-not-free-as-appearance-free-as-thing-in-itself). Freedom is thought, not cognized: the soul, considered from that side, I can cognize »durch keine speculative Vernunft, (noch weniger durch empirische Beobachtung)«, and hence not freedom either, »so kann ich mir doch die Freiheit denken, d. i. die Vorstellung davon enthält wenigstens keinen Widerspruch in sich« (B xxviii, 3:17.28–18.11, c-kant-freedom-cannot-be-cognized-by-speculative-reason, c-kant-freedom-thinkable-if-critical-distinction-holds).

Schopenhauer, §§ 18–23: the body is given to the subject »auf zwei ganz verschiedene Weisen«, as representation and »als jenes Jedem unmittelbar Bekannte, welches das Wort Wille bezeichnet« (§ 18, ZA I 142, c-schopenhauer-body-given-in-two-ways); »Der Willensakt und die Aktion des Leibes ... sind Eines und das Selbe, nur auf zwei gänzlich verschiedene Weisen gegeben« (ibid., c-schopenhauer-act-of-will-and-action-of-body-identical); »Ding an sich aber ist allein der Wille« (§ 21, ZA I 154, c-schopenhauer-will-alone-is-thing-in-itself); the name is »nur eine denominatio a potiori« (§ 22, ZA I 154, c-schopenhauer-will-named-a-potiori), and the word designates »ein durchaus unmittelbar Erkanntes« (§ 22, ZA I 155, c-schopenhauer-will-not-inferred-but-immediately-known); the will as thing in itself is »schlechthin grundlos« and »Einer« (§ 23, ZA I 157, c-schopenhauer-will-groundless-and-one).

Nietzsche, JGB 16, 19 and 36 and GD: there are still harmless self-observers who believe in immediate certainties, »zum Beispiel "ich denke", oder, wie es der Aberglaube Schopenhauer's war, "ich will"« (JGB 16, c-nietzsche-schopenhauer-ich-will-a-superstition); »Wollen scheint mir vor Allem etwas Complicirtes, Etwas, das nur als Wort eine Einheit ist« (JGB 19, c-nietzsche-willing-is-complicated); among a chain of »irrthümlichen Schlüssen«, »der Wollende glaubt, mit einem ziemlichen Grad von Sicherheit, dass Wille und Aktion irgendwie Eins seien« (JGB 19, c-nietzsche-belief-will-and-action-one-an-erroneous-inference); »Der Wille bewegt nichts mehr, erklärt folglich auch nichts mehr« (»Die vier grossen Irrthümer« 3, c-nietzsche-will-moves-nothing); and JGB 36 closes, »Die Welt von innen gesehen ... sie wäre eben "Wille zur Macht" und nichts ausserdem« (c-nietzsche-world-would-be-will-to-power), a sentence whose force is the map's second contested reading, the one of Nietzsche (below).

Where a premise is shared

No shares_premise_with link is set on this page, and it carries no shared entry. The pairs the map holds that touch the will are set on the comparison on the thing in itself, where § 23's will as thing in itself, free of the forms among which are »Zeit und Raum«, shares with A 26 / B 42 the premise that space is no determination of the thing in itself; this page adds none, and says why for the two nearest candidates.

Kant and Schopenhauer on the law and the thing in itself. Kant at B xxvii: if the deduction is right, »der Grundsatz der Causalität nur auf Dinge im ersten Sinne genommen, nämlich so fern sie Gegenstände der Erfahrung sind, geht, eben dieselbe aber nach der zweiten Bedeutung ihm nicht unterworfen sind« (3:17.20–24, c-kant-causality-applies-only-to-things-as-objects-of-experience); Schopenhauer at § 23: »Der Wille als Ding an sich liegt ... außerhalb des Gebietes des Satzes vom Grund in allen seinen Gestaltungen, und ist folglich schlechthin grundlos, obwohl jede seiner Erscheinungen durchaus dem Satz vom Grunde unterworfen ist« (ZA I 157, c-schopenhauer-will-groundless-and-one). Both withhold the law from the thing in itself and keep it for what appears, Kant under his condition. No link is set, for the reason the other page gives of the same Kant clause: it stands under »wenn die Deduction ihrer Verstandesbegriffe richtig ist« and asserts nothing outright, where the convention requires that both statements assert one proposition; and the two subjects and the two laws differ, Kant's things taken in two meanings and the principle of causality, Schopenhauer's the will as thing in itself and the principle of sufficient reason in all its shapes. A reader who holds that a conditional whose antecedent the author elsewhere asserts shares its consequent may dispute the absence; no passage in the map has Kant assert the deduction right, and the map does not say it.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the will as cause. Schopenhauer at § 18: the act of will and the action of the body »stehn nicht im Verhältniß der Ursache und Wirkung« (ZA I 142, c-schopenhauer-act-of-will-and-action-of-body-identical); Nietzsche in GD: »Der Wille bewegt nichts mehr, erklärt folglich auch nichts mehr - er begleitet bloss Vorgänge, er kann auch fehlen« (»Die vier grossen Irrthümer« 3, c-nietzsche-will-moves-nothing). Both deny that the will is the cause of what the body does, and it is the nearest the map has come to a premise shared by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. No link is set: the proposition the two would share, that the act of will is not the cause of the action of the body, is worded by Schopenhauer's sentence and is reached from Nietzsche's, which says of the will that it moves nothing at all, only by an instance the map would have to supply; Schopenhauer's sentence denies the causal relation because the two »sind Eines und das Selbe«, and the same Nietzsche sentence has the will accompany processes and »auch fehlen«; and Nietzsche's »mehr« speaks of what the will is for us today, after »Wir glauben heute kein Wort mehr von dem Allen«. Whether a sentence that denies the will all causality asserts, among other things, what Schopenhauer's denies of one case is the question, and a reader may dispute the absence. JGB 19 is on the other side of the same sentence of Schopenhauer's: it calls the belief that will and action are one an erroneous inference, and the attack link is set (below).

None with Nietzsche otherwise. The three Nietzsche statements that name what Schopenhauer states deny it, and are set as attacks; JGB 36's »"Wille" kann natürlich nur auf "Wille" wirken« is a sentence inside the attempt the aphorism proposes, after »thun wir das ... so müssen wir den Versuch machen«, and asserts nothing the map could pair with § 18 or § 21.

Where they diverge

On what the will is. Kant's will is thought »als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig«, as belonging to a thing in itself; Schopenhauer's will is the thing in itself, »Ding an sich aber ist allein der Wille«. That is the hinge of the comparison, and it is a difference in the texts' own words: no Kant passage in the map says that the will is a thing in itself, and what the thing in itself is remains, on his other sentences in the map, unknown (c-kant-things-in-themselves-unknown). What »angehörig« comes to depends on the reading of Kant: on the two-aspect reading the will's belonging to a thing in itself is the same will considered apart from the conditions of sensibility, on the two-object reading the thing in itself it belongs to is a being distinct from the appearance; the map does not pick, and the section on the readings below says what each does to the comparison. Schopenhauer's § 22 says why the thing in itself bears the name: it is that »welches als solches nimmermehr Objekt ist«, and had, if it was to be thought objectively, to borrow name and concept from the most perfect of its appearances, »des Menschen Wille«, so that the naming is »nur eine denominatio a potiori« by which the concept will receives a greater extension (c-schopenhauer-will-named-a-potiori); the will so named is free of every form of its appearance, »Schon die allgemeinste Form aller Vorstellung, die des Objekts für ein Subjekt, trifft ihn nicht« (§ 23, ZA I 156, c-schopenhauer-will-free-of-forms-of-appearance), groundless and one, and § 25 draws, by the map's checked argument on two bridges it names, that if the thing in itself is the will it lies outside time and space and knows no plurality (c-schopenhauer-will-apart-from-appearance-outside-time-and-space-knows-no-plurality). The route to the identification is § 19's, conditional and epistemic: if the corporeal world is to be more than our representation, »so müssen wir sagen, daß sie außer der Vorstellung, also an sich und ihrem Innersten Wesen nach, Das sei, was wir in uns selbst unmittelbar als Willen finden« (ZA I 148, a-schopenhauer-corporeal-world-in-itself-is-will), a reason and not a proof, as the argument's body says; the step from that conditional to § 21's assertion the map has not formalized. Nietzsche: willing seems to him, »scheint mir«, a unity only as a word, the one word hiding »eine Mehrheit von Gefühlen«, a »commandirenden Gedanken« and »jener Affekt des Commando's« (JGB 19, c-nietzsche-willing-contains-feelings-thought-and-affect), and GD says of the will, »Heute wissen wir, dass er bloss ein Wort ist« (»Die ›Vernunft‹ in der Philosophie« 5, c-nietzsche-will-as-cause-the-great-error). What JGB 36 then does with »Wille zur Macht« is the contested reading, below; the aphorism puts »"intelligiblen Charakter"« in Nietzsche's own quotation marks, and since no Kant passage in the map carries the term, the page does not call it Kant's.

On immediacy, and the attacks. Schopenhauer's will is »ein durchaus unmittelbar Erkanntes und so sehr Bekanntes, daß wir, was Wille sei, viel besser wissen und verstehn, als sonst irgend etwas« (§ 22, ZA I 155), and the identity of will and body is raised »aus dem unmittelbaren Bewußtsein, aus der Erkenntniß in concreto, zum Wissen der Vernunft« and can never be proved, »eben weil sie selbst die unmittelbarste ist« (§ 18, ZA I 144–145, c-schopenhauer-identity-of-will-and-body-cannot-be-proved). The first two attack links the map set, on 2026-10-09, are on the § 22 claim: JGB 16's »wie es der Aberglaube Schopenhauer's war, "ich will"«, which denies the immediacy and says nothing of the other half of the target, that the will is not reached by inference; and JGB 19's »dass er ein Volks-Vorurtheil übernommen und übertrieben hat«, which denies »ganz und gar bekannt«, that is »so sehr Bekanntes ... viel besser wissen«, and not the inference either (c-nietzsche-schopenhauer-took-over-popular-prejudice). Each Nietzsche node says what its sentence denies and what it leaves. The two § 18 statements in the same row also word immediacy, »jenes Jedem unmittelbar Bekannte« and »die unmittelbarste«: JGB 16 names »ich will«, the act, for which the JGB 16 node calls § 18's first sentence the nearer one, so since 2026-10-15 the link is set on that statement too, with its converse, and the JGB 16 node says so; it is not set on the identity's statement, which asserts that the identity can be shown and not proved and gives its immediacy as the ground, »eben weil«, where JGB 16 names no identity, and a reader may dispute that absence. No Kant passage in the map speaks of immediacy; what the map has of him here is a denial of cognition from that side: the soul »von der letzteren Seite betrachtet«, that of the thing in itself the will is thought as belonging to, I cannot cognize »durch keine speculative Vernunft, (noch weniger durch empirische Beobachtung)«, because I would have to cognize such a being »seiner Existenz nach und doch nicht in der Zeit bestimmt«, which is impossible »weil ich meinem Begriffe keine Anschauung unterlegen kann« (B xxviii, 3:17.28–18.06). Set beside § 18, Kant's will is thought as belonging to a thing in itself and Schopenhauer's is the thing in itself, and the texts part on whether it is known on that side: Kant denies cognition of the soul from that side by speculative reason and by empirical observation, Schopenhauer has the will »unmittelbar« known in self-consciousness. Whether the »unmittelbaren Bewußtsein« of § 18 is the empirical observation Kant names, or an intuition of the kind Kant says he cannot lay under his concept, is not stated in any passage in the map, and the map does not say. No attack link is set between the two: Kant's statement denies cognition of the soul from the side of the thing in itself and of freedom as a property of a being with effects in the world of sense, Schopenhauer's statements assert an immediate cognition of the will and the identity of will and body, and neither statement words the other's denial; a reader who holds that § 22 denies what B xxviii states may dispute the absence.

On the will as cause. Schopenhauer denies that the act of will and the action of the body are two states linked by causality: »sie sind Eines und das Selbe, nur auf zwei gänzlich verschiedene Weisen gegeben«, and »Jeder wahre Akt seines Willens ist sofort und unausbleiblich auch eine Bewegung seines Leibes« (§ 18, ZA I 142). Nietzsche's JGB 19 makes the belief that will and action are one the product of an expected effect: »Weil in den allermeisten Fällen nur gewollt worden ist, wo auch die Wirkung des Befehls, also der Gehorsam, also die Aktion erwartet werden durfte, so hat sich der Anschein in das Gefühl übersetzt, als ob es da eine Nothwendigkeit von Wirkung gäbe«; the attack link is set on the § 18 claim, on both halves of what it states, the denied causal relation and the asserted identity, and the Nietzsche node says that Schopenhauer is named at the opening of the aphorism and not in the sentence. Set side by side, the two texts both refuse a relation of cause and effect between will and action, Schopenhauer because the two are one, the movement following »sofort und unausbleiblich«, Nietzsche because the feeling of a necessity of effect is, he says, an »Anschein«, a semblance, translated into feeling; the map sets no shared premise on that, since Nietzsche's sentence words the necessity as a feeling the semblance became and asserts nothing of what will and action are, and what Schopenhauer asserts of them is what the sentence calls an erroneous inference. GD goes further than JGB 19: our belief that we know what a cause is came »Aus dem Bereich der berühmten "inneren Thatsachen"«, the first and most convincing of them »die vom Willen als Ursache« (c-nietzsche-belief-in-causation-from-inner-facts), and today »Der Wille bewegt nichts mehr, erklärt folglich auch nichts mehr - er begleitet bloss Vorgänge, er kann auch fehlen«, the motive »Bloss ein Oberflächenphänomen des Bewusstseins, ein Nebenher der That« (c-nietzsche-motive-a-surface-phenomenon), the I »zur Fabel geworden«; from the three denials the map's checked argument reaches, on a bridge it names, that »Die ganze angebliche Empirie dafür gieng zum Teufel«, and the text, by »Das folgt daraus«, that »Es giebt gar keine geistigen Ursachen!« (c-nietzsche-no-spiritual-causes), a step the map records and has not formalized. No attack link is set from »Der Wille bewegt nichts mehr« on § 18: Schopenhauer's statement does not say that the will moves the body, it denies that act of will and action are cause and effect, and the attack on the identity rests on JGB 19, which names the belief; whether »er kann auch fehlen« denies the identity is a question about what Nietzsche's »Vorgänge« are, which the sentence does not say, and a reader may dispute the absence. JGB 36 is the hinge inside Nietzsche: »ob wir an die Causalität des Willens glauben: thun wir das - und im Grunde ist der Glaube daran eben unser Glaube an Causalität selbst -, so müssen wir den Versuch machen, die Willens-Causalität hypothetisch als die einzige zu setzen« (c-nietzsche-will-causality-posited-as-the-only); on the reading on which the aphorism does not assert its conclusion, GD's »bewegt nichts mehr« denies the antecedent, on the reading on which it does GD's denial concerns the will as an inner faculty only, a move the other reading's node records as what tells against itself and the asserted reading's node does not yet state, and the map picks neither. Kant has no position in this row: B xxvii–xxviii's will in the appearance is »dem Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäß«, a will whose visible actions are under the law, and no passage in the map has Kant on the will as a cause of actions.

On freedom. Kant's case at B xxvii–xxviii is the case of the will: without the distinction, causality would have to hold »durchaus von allen Dingen überhaupt als wirkenden Ursachen«, and of one being, taken in one meaning, »als Ding überhaupt (als Sache an sich selbst)«, one could not say that its will is free and yet not free without an obvious contradiction (c-kant-without-distinction-causality-holds-of-all-things, c-kant-without-distinction-free-will-is-a-contradiction); with it, the same will is thought in the appearance »als dem Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäß und so fern nicht frei« and as belonging to a thing in itself »jenem nicht unterworfen, mithin als frei«; and so freedom can be thought, by the map's checked argument, whose bridge from the two predicates of one will to the representation of freedom is the map's and whose antecedent takes the restriction of causality as given. Kant's »frei« is »jenem nicht unterworfen«, not subject to the law of nature, and the freedom in question is freedom »als Eigenschaft eines Wesens, dem ich Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt zuschreibe« (B xxviii). Schopenhauer's two sentences in this row say of the will as thing in itself that it is »völlig frei von allen Formen derselben«, the forms of its appearance, and »schlechthin grundlos, obwohl jede seiner Erscheinungen durchaus dem Satz vom Grunde unterworfen ist«. What is parallel: both texts put the will outside the law on the side of the thing in itself and under it on the side of appearance, Kant as it is thought if the critique is right, Kant's »in der Erscheinung (den sichtbaren Handlungen) als dem Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäß«, Schopenhauer's »jede seiner Erscheinungen durchaus dem Satz vom Grunde unterworfen«. What is not: Kant's is the object taken in two meanings and one will thought in the appearance and as belonging to a thing in itself, under »Wenn aber die Kritik nicht geirrt hat«; Schopenhauer's will is the thing in itself and its appearances are its objectity; and Kant's »frei« is a predicate of a will in its relation to the law of nature, where Schopenhauer's »frei von allen Formen« is a freedom from the forms of representation and »grundlos« an absence of ground. Whether the two words »frei« say one thing is a question the map leaves open; no link is set, for the reasons under the shared premises, and no passage in the map has Schopenhauer on the freedom of the will in Kant's sense, a will free or not free in its actions. Nietzsche's cells in this row are JGB 21's: »Wir sind es, die allein die Ursachen, das Nacheinander, das Für-einander, die Relativität, den Zwang, die Zahl, das Gesetz, die Freiheit, den Grund, den Zweck erdichtet haben« (c-nietzsche-projecting-sign-world-as-in-itself-is-mythology), freedom among the signs we invented and read »als "an sich"« into things, in Nietzsche's own voice; and »Im "An-sich" giebt es nichts von "Causal-Verbänden", von "Nothwendigkeit", von "psychologischer Unfreiheit"« (c-nietzsche-in-the-in-itself-nothing-of-causal-connections), every term in his quotation marks. They are set for those words, and neither is about a will free or not free in its actions, Kant's question, nor about the will as thing in itself, Schopenhauer's; the same aphorism opens with the causa sui as »der beste Selbst-Widerspruch, der bisher ausgedacht worden ist« (c-nietzsche-causa-sui-best-self-contradiction), and the rest of JGB 21 and of JGB 19 is not in the map, so nothing on this page says more of what Nietzsche says of the freedom of the will.

On what is drawn from the will. Kant draws the place of morality: supposing morality presupposes freedom »als Eigenschaft unseres Willens« and speculative reason had proved freedom unthinkable, »so muß nothwendig jene Voraussetzung, nämlich die moralische, derjenigen weichen, deren Gegentheil einen offenbaren Widerspruch enthält« (B xxviii, 3:18.11–21, c-kant-if-freedom-unthinkable-morality-yields-to-mechanism); »So aber«, since morality needs only »daß Freiheit sich nur nicht selbst widerspreche«, the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature each hold their place, of »eben derselben Handlung (in anderer Beziehung genommen)« (B xxviii–xxix, 3:18.21–30, c-kant-same-action-in-another-relation), which would not have happened had the critique not restricted all theoretical cognition to appearances; both limbs of the supposition stay supposition, and no passage in the map has Kant assert that morality presupposes freedom in the strictest sense as a property of our will; what B xxviii–xxix asserts is that morality needs freedom not to contradict itself. Schopenhauer draws the key to nature: the double cognition of one's own body is to be used »als einen Schlüssel zum Wesen jeder Erscheinung in der Natur«, all other objects judged »nach Analogie jenes Leibes«, because »Außer dem Willen und der Vorstellung ist uns gar nichts bekannt, noch denkbar« (§ 19, ZA I 147–148, c-schopenhauer-other-objects-judged-by-analogy-with-body, c-schopenhauer-nothing-known-but-will-and-representation), the step Schopenhauer's own words call »beurtheilen« and »annehmen«. Nietzsche draws, in GD, that there are no spiritual causes and that the I »hat ganz und gar aufgehört, zu denken, zu fühlen und zu wollen« (c-nietzsche-ich-become-a-fable); and, in JGB 36, under »Gesetzt, dass nichts Anderes als real "gegeben" ist als unsre Welt der Begierden und Leidenschaften«, the attempt to understand the mechanistic world from the reality of the drives, »nicht als eine Täuschung, einen "Schein", eine "Vorstellung" (im Berkeley'schen und Schopenhauerischen Sinne)« (c-nietzsche-mechanistic-world-not-representation-in-schopenhauers-sense), an attempt the aphorism calls »vom Gewissen der Methode aus, geboten«; the map sets no attack from it on § 1's world as representation, since a proposal to attempt the contrary is not a denial, and the Nietzsche node says so. Where Schopenhauer's key is the body known twice, Nietzsche's starting point is the drives, and his »Vorstellung« in Schopenhauer's sense is what the attempt is to do without.

What depends on the readings

Of JGB 36. On the reading on which the aphorism asserts its conclusion, Nietzsche puts a will in the place Schopenhauer's will held: the world »von innen gesehen« would be will to power and nothing besides, and the row on what the will is has three answers, Kant's will belonging to a thing in itself, Schopenhauer's will as thing in itself, Nietzsche's will to power, with Nietzsche's route the attempt »aus Seines-Gleichen« to understand the mechanistic world from the drives where Schopenhauer's is self-consciousness; and on that reading JGB 36's »"Wille" kann natürlich nur auf "Wille" wirken« makes will a cause, and the readings differ on whether GD's »bewegt nichts mehr« reaches it. On the reading on which it does not, the conditional's premises are ones Nietzsche rejects, the causality of the will among them, his answer to the question what the will is stays JGB 19's complication and GD's word, and the row has two answers and a refusal. The map does not pick (CHARTER.md P9), and each reading's node says what tells against it.

Of Kant. The map holds two readings of the same objects taken as appearance and as thing in itself at B xxvi, two-aspect and two-object, and »als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig« at B xxvii–xxviii goes with them. On the two-object reading the will is thought as belonging to a being distinct from its appearance, and Schopenhauer, keeping »den Kantischen Ausdruck als stehende Formel« (§ 22), gives that place the name will, whether his will is Kant's being being a question of the map's and not of any passage; on the two-aspect reading the will thought as belonging to a thing in itself is the same will considered apart from the conditions of sensibility, and the nearer Schopenhauer sentence in form is § 25's will »als solcher und gesondert von seiner Erscheinung betrachtet«. On neither reading does any Kant passage in the map say what the thing in itself is; the comparison with § 21 rests on that silence either way.

What the map does not yet contain

Kant's A 538–541 / B 566–569, the Grundlegung and the second Critique, so that no sentence here says Kant asserts that morality presupposes freedom in the strictest sense, which B xxviii supposes; the footnote at B xxvi–xxvii. Schopenhauer's § 20, § 23 beyond the two spans of its first paragraph that the map holds (ZA I 156 and ZA I 157) and the sentence between them, § 25 beyond its first paragraph's opening, §§ 26–29, and the fourth Book, including § 55. Nietzsche's JGB 19 beyond the two spans the map holds (its opening, to the affect of command, and the sentences on the »Wunderlichste am Willen«), JGB 21 beyond the two spans the map holds (its first sentence, and from »Man soll nicht« to »mythologisch«), and GD »Die vier grossen Irrthümer« 7–8. Each would add a cell; none is needed for the rows above, whose every filled cell cites its passage, and the one empty cell says what is absent.

The comparison is draft: built on 2026-10-15 by the operator from nodes already in the map (Kant's A 42 / B 59 added 2026-10-06, B xxvii–xxix on 2026-10-07 and 2026-10-11; Schopenhauer's §§ 18–23 and the Anhang's sentence on self-consciousness added 2026-10-08, § 25 on 2026-10-13; Nietzsche's JGB 16, 19, 36 and GD added 2026-10-09, JGB 21 on 2026-10-12), with no new node and one link set on an existing pair, JGB 16's attack on § 18's first sentence, recorded in CHANGELOG.md, and offered to the owner, Andries (BOARD.md), for the same qualified review the comparison on the thing in itself had (ASKS.md, Ask 9). No human has read it; the translations were not independently verified, and no one has attested the page.